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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the early 1900s, Congress has enacted legislation to deter 
discrimination in the workplace and provide remedies for 
discrimination victims.1 All of the antidiscrimination acts prohibit 
employers from making employment decisions, such as hiring and 
firing, based on certain prohibited characteristics.2 To succeed with an 
employment discrimination claim, plaintiffs must ultimately prove that 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S., cum laude, Dec. 2006, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.  
1 Among such legislation is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits 
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)–2000(e)–17 (2006). Likewise, 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits employers from 
discriminating on the basis of age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006). The Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). A similar, though less well-known, piece of federal 
antidiscrimination legislation is the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), which prohibits adverse action based on 
association with the military. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4333 (2006). 
2 Taran S. Kaler, Comment, Controlling the Cat’s Paw: Circuit Split 
Concerning the Level of Control a Biased Subordinate Must Exert over the Formal 
Decisionmaker’s Choice to Terminate, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2008). 
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they were the victims of intentional discrimination.3 Yet this decisive 
issue begs the question of who must possess the discriminatory intent. 
Liability certainly exists when plaintiffs demonstrate that an employer, 
as defined by statute,4 took an adverse employment action because of 
discriminatory animus. But because the antidiscrimination statutes also 
extend liability to actions taken by an employer’s agent,5 plaintiffs can 
also hold employers vicariously liable.6  
In today’s modern workplace, it is quite common to hold 
employers responsible for the actions of their agents. Employers are 
typically large corporate entities, and the principal employer rarely 
personally effectuates employment decisions against plaintiffs so as to 
be held directly liable.7 Instead, the employer’s agent likely made the 
discriminatory decision, and the plaintiff is attempting to hold the 
principal employer vicariously liable. Agents are commonly 
supervisory employees who possess delegated authority to alter the 
employment terms of lower-level employees.8 Thus, employers can be 
held liable, whether directly or vicariously, when they or their agents 
take an adverse employment action against an employee with a 
prohibited discriminatory intent.  
However, under the colorfully-named cat’s paw doctrine, 
plaintiffs can also succeed when an employee involved in the 
decisionmaking process, besides the actual decisionmaker, had 
                                                 
3 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000). 
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Title VII definition of “employer”); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) 
(ADEA definition of “employer”); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)–(B) (ADA definition of 
“employer”). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)–(B). 
6 See generally Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) 
(discussing issue of vicarious liability in the employment discrimination context). 
7 Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: 
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 
495–96 (2001); Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor 
Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L. 
REV. 1117, 1144 (2008). 
8 Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within Grasp of the Cat’s Paw: 
Delineating the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal 
Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV. 383, 384 (2008). 
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discriminatory intent.9 The cat’s paw theory of liability emerged to 
account for the fact that employers’ decisionmaking processes have 
become more complicated and discriminatory motives can exist at 
various levels.10 Large employers have established a decisionmaking 
hierarchy that has many layers of supervisory employees.11 
Employment decisions are rarely made by a single individual; instead, 
decisions are made based upon the input of several different people.12 
Higher-level supervisory employees may have to make decisions 
about employees that they do not personally know or have never even 
met.13 Consequently, supervisors must rely on information, 
recommendations and evaluations provided by subordinate employees 
when making personnel decisions.14  
In this context, cat’s paw liability “refers to a situation in which a 
biased subordinate, who lacks decisionmaking power, uses the formal 
decisionmaker as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a 
discriminatory employment action.”15 Although the cat’s paw doctrine 
was first introduced into employment discrimination law in 1990,16 it 
actually derives its name from French poet Jean de La Fontaine’s 
seventeenth century fable “The Monkey and the Cat.”17 As the tale 
goes, a monkey convinces an unsuspecting cat to scoop chestnuts from 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 484–
85 (10th Cir. 2006). 
10 BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 488.  
11 Martin, supra note 7, at 1144. 
12 White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 495–96. 
13 Sara Eber, Comment, How Much Power Should Be in the Paw?: 
Independent Investigations and the Cat’s Paw Doctrine, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 
142 (2008). 
14 Phillip J. Fowler, Employment Cases and the “Cat’s Paw” Theory, 22 JAN. 
CBA REC. 44 (2008). 
15 EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 
2006). 
16 Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404–05 (7th Cir. 1990). 
17 See BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 484 (citing Gustave Dore, FABLES OF LA 
FONTAINE 344 (Walter Thornbury trans., Chartwell Books 1984)). 
 110
3
Kepner: True to the Fable?: Examining the Appropriate Reach of Cat's Paw
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
a hot fire.18 The cat agrees and pulls chestnuts out one by one, burning 
his paw in the process.19 At the same time, the monkey eagerly eats all 
the chestnuts and leaves none for the cat.20 In today’s society, the 
phrase cat’s paw generally means “one used by another to accomplish 
his purpose.”21  
Recently, cat’s paw liability has become an issue of particular 
interest in employment law.22 Since its introduction, nearly all United 
States Courts of Appeal have recognized and adopted the cat’s paw 
doctrine.23 However, the circuit courts disagree about how much 
control the biased employee must possess over the decisionmaker to 
impose liability on the employer.24 Several circuit courts have adopted 
a lenient standard that requires the biased employee to exercise 
“influence” over or provide “input” to the decisionmaker.25 In 
contrast, the Fourth Circuit has adopted a stringent rule that th
employee must be principally responsible so as to be considered the 
actual decisionmaker.
e biased 
                                                
26 The Fourth Circuit refuses to impose liability 
even if the biased employee exercised “substantial influence” over the 
decisionmaker.27 Falling between these two extremes, the Tenth 
Circuit focuses on whether the biased employee “caused” the adverse 
 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 354 
(2002)). 
22 Sean Ratliff, Comment, Independent Investigations: An Inequitable Out for 
Employers in Cat’s Paw Cases, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 255, 258 (2009). 
23 EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th Cir. 
2006). 
24 Id.  
25 See, e.g., Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 
(3d. Cir. 2001) (stating “[u]nder our case law, it is sufficient if those exhibiting 
discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decision to terminate”). 
26 See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 289 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
27 Id. 
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employment action.28 Yet the Tenth Circuit did not elaborate on what 
standard of causation was required. After introducing the cat’s paw 
theory, the Seventh Circuit has applied the doctrine inconsistently. At 
times, the Seventh Circuit has used a causation based standard, while 
in other cases the court has applied a more lenient standard. Most 
recently, the Seventh Circuit adopted a “singular influence” standard 
that closely aligns with the Fourth Circuit’s strict rule.  
In 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari 
to hear a cat’s paw case and to decide whether an employer can be 
held liable for a subordinate’s discriminatory animus when the 
ultimate decisionmaker harbored no discriminatory motive.29 The 
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari garnered increased attention to the 
circuit split, and the legal community anticipated that the case’s 
outcome would profoundly impact the cat’s paw doctrine.30 However, 
less than one week before oral argument was scheduled to be heard, 
the Supreme Court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss.31 
Therefore, without guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuit split 
regarding cat’s paw liability continues.32  
Part I of this comment will describe the legal background and 
origins of the cat’s paw theory of employment discrimination. Part II 
will then delve into the current circuit split, examining the varying 
approaches used to determine liability. Part III will specifically 
examine the Seventh Circuit’s unclear cat’s paw precedent and its 
recent shift to a stricter standard. Part IV will argue that the courts 
                                                 
28 BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 487. 
29 BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. EEOC, 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. 
granted, 549 U.S. 1105 (2007). 
30 Angelo J. Genova & Francis J. Vernoia, Practical Considerations from 
Recent Development in Employment Law: An Analysis of Murphy v. IRS, the “Cat’s 
Paw” Doctrine and Comparative Obligations Under the Faragher and Ellerth 
Affirmative Defense, PRAC. L. INST., Litigating Employment Discrimination Claims 
2007, June 2007, at 9, 20, 22. 
31 BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. EEOC, 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. 
dismissed, 549 U.S 1334 (2007). 
32 See Ratliff, supra note 22, at 260. 
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should adopt the motivating factor standard of causation, should more 
carefully scrutinize whether an independent investigation breaks the 
causal chain, and should apply agency principles as a proper limitation 
on liability.  
 
 
I. CAT’S PAW LIABILITY: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS 
 
A. Fundamentals of Employment Discrimination Law:  
Causation and Agency 
 
A critical issue in employment discrimination law involves the 
element of causation. The antidiscrimination statutes prohibit 
employers from engaging in intentional discrimination, which has 
come to be referred to as disparate treatment.33 Plaintiffs bringing 
disparate treatment claims must ultimately prove that the employer 
made the adverse employment decision because of a prohibited 
characteristic.34 Yet wide dispute exists regarding the appropriate 
standard of causation.35 Courts, commentators, and legislators have 
utilized a variety of “phrases and formulations to describe the 
causation requirement in disparate treatment doctrine.”36 In terms of 
statutory language, the antidiscrimination acts require plaintiffs to 
prove that the adverse employment action was taken “because of” the 
plaintiff’s membership in a protected class.37 Although the “because 
of” language certainly establishes a causation requirement, the phrase 
                                                 
33 Curtis J. Thomas, Note, Cat's in the Cradle: Tenth Circuit Provides Silver 
Spoon of Subordinate Bias Liability in EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los 
Angeles, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 629, 633 (2008). 
34 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000). 
35 White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 504. 
36 Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of 
Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 500 (2006) [hereinafter 
Katz I]. For example, the Supreme Court used over twenty different formulations to 
describe the causation requirement in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Id. at 491. 
37 Rachel Santoro, Narrowing the Cat’s Paw: An Argument for a Uniform 
Subordinate Bias Liability Standard, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 823, 831 (2009).  
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does not inherently dictate what the standard of causation should be.38 
Consequently, uncertainty regarding the causation requirement has 
developed and burdened disparate treatment law on a macro level.39 
Nonetheless, two evidentiary methods have developed to assist 
plaintiffs in meeting the ultimate burden of proving intentional 
discrimination.40 First, plaintiffs can use the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting framework.41 This approach requires plaintiffs to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which consists of four 
elements: (1) membership in a protected class, (2) qualification for the 
job, (3) an adverse employment decision, and (4) circumstances 
indicating that the protected class membership caused the adverse 
employment action.42 If the plaintiff proves these elements, then the 
burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate non-discriminatory 
reason for the adverse employment action.43 If the employer is able to 
offer a legitimate reason, the plaintiff must show that the offered 
reason was merely pretext.44 At this point, the burden of proving 
                                                 
38 Katz I, supra note 36, at 491. 
39 Id. at 493. 
40 Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 398. Courts traditionally have utilized the 
mixed-motive framework when plaintiffs present direct evidence of discrimination 
and used the McDonnell Douglas framework when presented with circumstantial 
evidence of discrimination. Id. at 399–400. However, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa has called this dichotomy into question. Id. at 400. 
Desert Palace held that plaintiffs are not required to present direct evidence of 
discrimination and thus definitely alters the mixed-motive framework. But the circuit 
courts have disagreed as to whether Desert Palace changed the McDonnell Douglas 
framework as well. Id.  
41 Thomas, supra note 33, at 634. 
42McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (2000); Dyke v. 
O’Neal Steel, Inc., 327 F.3d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 2003). 
43 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
44 Id. In this context, pretext “means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some 
action . . . [P]retext for discrimination means more than an unusual act; it means 
something worse than a business error; ‘pretext’ means deceit used to cover one’s 
tracks.” Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
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pretext “merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that 
[the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination.”45  
Second, plaintiffs can proceed under the “mixed-motives” 
framework.46 The mixed-motives framework was originally 
established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and this method allows 
plaintiffs to bring claims when the employer was motivated by both 
permissible and forbidden reasons.47 The Price Waterhouse plurality 
concluded that the phrase “because of” did not require “but-for” 
causation.48 Instead, the Court interpreted “because of” to mean that 
the decision was motivated, in whole or in part, by the prohibited 
characteristic.49 Therefore, the plaintiff only needed to show that the 
prohibited characteristic was a motivating factor in the employer’s 
decision.50 If the plaintiff produces such discriminatory evidence, then 
the burden shifts to the employer. Historically, under Price 
Waterhouse, the employer could escape liability by demonstrating that 
it would have made the same decision even without the discriminatory 
bias.51  
In response to the Price Waterhouse decision, Congress enacted 
the 1991 Amendments to Title VII. Congress amended the Price 
Waterhouse rule that allowed employers to avoid liability with such 
proof.52 Now, employers can use proof that it would have taken the 
same action despite discriminatory bias only to limit the remedies 
available to the plaintiff.53 Congress simultaneously codified the rule 
                                                 
45 Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). 
46 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989), superseded by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 240 (stating “[t]o construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial 
shorthand for ‘but-for’ causation is to misunderstand them”). 
49 Id. 
50 See U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241. 
51 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Befort & 
Olig, supra note 8, at 399–400. 
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
53 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
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that plaintiffs only needed to show that their protected class played a 
“motivating factor” in the employment decision.54 In sum, the 
motivating factor test governs whether the conduct in question 
constitutes a violation of Title VII while, as a result, the same action 
test controls the type of compensation available to the victim.55  
Notably, Congress enacted the motivating factor and same action 
formulations only in relation to Title VII, raising questions as to 
whether these formulations applied to the other antidiscrimination 
statutes.56 Just recently, however, the Supreme Court held that the 
motivating factor test did not apply to disparate treatment claims 
brought pursuant to the ADEA.57 In a 5-4 decision, a majority of the 
Court decided that the ADEA’s “because of” language required 
plaintiffs to prove that age was the “but-for” cause of the adverse 
employment action.58 Regrettably, this decision adds further 
uncertainty to the already jumbled state of the causation requirement 
in disparate treatment law.  
In cat’s paw cases, plaintiffs can use either evidentiary 
framework.59 A plaintiff proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework may demonstrate that the employer’s alleged legitimate 
reason is actually pretext for a subordinate’s discriminatory motives.60 
Alternatively, a plaintiff using the mixed-motives framework must 
show that, even though a legitimate reason may have existed for the 
decision, the subordinate’s bias played a motivating role in the 
employment action.61 Yet regardless of which evidentiary method is 
                                                 
54 Specifically, Section 107 provides that “an unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though 
other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
55 Katz I, supra note 36, at 492–94. 
56 Id. at 492–93. 
57 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2349–51 (2009). 
58 Id. at 2352. 
59 Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 401. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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used, the ultimate question remains “whether the plaintiff was the 
victim of intentional discrimination.”62 
In addition to the element of causation, another important issue 
concerns the scope of vicarious liability under the antidiscrimination 
statutes. All of the statutes protect against discrimination committed by 
an employer and its agents.63 The Supreme Court has observed that 
the agency language “surely evinces an intent to place some limits on 
the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be 
held responsible.”64 Accordingly, an employer cannot be held liable
for every employee’s actions, but only for those employees that can 
considered agents. To determine the proper scope of vicarious liability, 
Congress has directed courts to utilize common law agency 
principles.
 
be 
                                                
65  
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court 
followed Congress’ direction when it used agency principles to 
consider when an employer can be held vicariously liable for its 
supervisors’ actions.66 The Supreme Court began by referencing the 
well-established agency principle that employers are vicariously liable 
for the torts committed by employees acting within the scope of their 
employment.67 To be within the scope of employment, the employee’s 
action must be motivated, at least in part, by a desire to serve the 
 
62 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000). 
63 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). Title VII defines employer as “a person 
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for 
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or 
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
64 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
65 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 791–792 (1998); see also 
Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998). 
66 524 U.S. at 754. Specifically, the Court addressed the issue of “whether an 
employer has vicarious liability when a supervisor creates a hostile work 
environment by making explicit threats to alter a subordinate’s terms or conditions 
of employment, based on sex, but does not fulfill the threat.” Id. 
67 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755–56 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 219(1) (1957)). 
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employer.68 Generally, an employee’s discriminatory bias does not 
constitute conduct that serves the employer’s business.69 However, the 
Supreme Court recognized that an exception to the scope of 
employment rule exists.70 Specifically, employers are liable when the 
employee was “aided in accomplishing” the discriminatory act “by the 
existence of the agency relation.”71 The Supreme Court stated that the 
mere existence of the employment relationship was not enough for this 
exception to apply; instead, the supervisory employee must be able to 
take a tangible employment action against the subordinate.72 The 
Supreme Court defined a tangible employment action as an action that 
“constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, 
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits.”73 The employer’s delegation of responsibility to the 
supervisory employee warrants vicarious liability.74 Thus, if the biased 
supervisory employee personally makes the decision, the employer 
will be vicariously liable for the supervisor’s intentional 
discrimination. Such a scenario, however, does not constitute a cat’s 
paw case.75 
Unlike the biased employee in a typical vicarious liability case, 
the employee in a cat’s paw case does not make the official decision. 
                                                 
68 Id. at 756 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228(1)(c), 230 
(1957)). 
69 See id. at 757. 
70 Id. at 758. 
71 Id. at 758 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957)).  
72 Id. at 760. 
73 Id. at 761. The Court did not define the outer contours of what constitutes a 
“tangible employment action.” Id. at 762–63. Some courts have interpreted it to 
require a materially adverse action. White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 521. One 
commentator has suggested that it should include any action that “a supervisor’s 
status as supervisor enables him to take.” Id.  
74 Brief of Respondent at 18–19, EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of 
L.A., 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006) (No. 06–341), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1334 
(2007). 
75 Eber, supra note 13, at 152.  
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Rather, the biased employee uses his ability to make evaluations and 
recommendations to trigger the actual decisionmaker to take the 
adverse action. In this context, courts impute the biased employee’s 
discriminatory intent to the actual decisionmaker, even when the 
actual decisionmaker is bias-free. Nonetheless, the agency principles 
associated with vicarious liability and Ellerth still serve to limit 
liability in cat’s paw cases, and courts often fashion the cat’s paw 
doctrine based on these principles.76  
 
B. Shager v. Upjohn: The Introduction of the Cat’s Paw Doctrine 
 
In 1990, Judge Richard Posner introduced the cat’s paw doctrine 
into employment discrimination law.77 The Seventh Circuit relied on 
causation and agency principles to conclude that an employer can be 
liable based on a subordinate employee’s discriminatory intent, even 
when the actual decisionmaker was admittedly-bias free.78 In Shager 
v. Upjohn Co., fifty-year old Ralph Shager argued that his forme
employer, Asgrow, should be liable for the alleged age-based animus 
of its manager, John Lehnst.
r 
                                                
79 Lehnst was Asgrow’s youngest district 
manager, and he supervised Shager and other sales representatives.80 
Soon after starting at the company, Lehnst divided the Wisconsin 
territory into two sections and assigned the more difficult section to 
Shager.81 Lehnst later decided to hire a third sales representative for 
the Wisconsin territory, even though the territory was not generating 
enough business to justify a third position.82 Lehnst hired Schradel, a 
twenty-nine year old, for the position and assigned Schradel to the best 
 
76 Ali Razzaghi, Comment, Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, 
Inc.: “Substantially Influencing” the Fourth Circuit to Change its Standard for 
Imputing Employer Liability for the Biases of a Non-Decisionmaker, 73 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1709, 1714 (2005); Eber, supra note 13, at 152–53. 
77 Shager v. Upjohn Company, 913 F.2d 398, 404–05 (7th Cir. 1990). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 399. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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section while Shager retained the worst section.83 Despite the 
difference in sales potential between the two sections, Shager’s total 
sales far exceeded Schradel’s total sales.84 Yet Lehnst inexplicably 
gave both sales representatives only marginal reviews and even made 
excuses for Schradel’s performance.85 Lehnst later placed Shager on 
probation for alleged problems collecting accounts receivable and 
managing salesmen.86 When the problems continued, Lehnst 
recommended to the company’s “Career Path Committee” that Shager 
be terminated.87 In July of 1986, the Career Path Committee fired 
Shager.88  
Subsequently, Shager sued his former employer under the 
ADEA,89 alleging that he was terminated because of his age.90 Shager 
presented evidence that Lehnst was biased against older workers.91 
Lehnst was apparently troubled by the age difference between himself 
and his subordinates, many of whom were in their fifties. On one 
occasion, Lehnst asked a potential employee whether he would mind 
being supervised by a younger man.92 Lehnst also told a younger 
employee that “[t]hese older people don’t much like or much care for 
us baby boomers, but there isn’t much they can do about it.”93 
Additionally, Lehnst exaggerated the reasons for putting Shager on 
probation and later recommending his termination.94 Likewise, Lehnst 
curiously gave Shager a low evaluation, despite Shager’s exceptional 
                                                 
83 Id. at 399–400. 
84 Id. at 400. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006).  
90 Shager, 913 F.2d at 400. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 399. 
93 Id. at 400. 
94 Id. 
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sales record.95 And during Shradel’s first evaluation, Lehnst 
commented on how “refreshing” it was to work with a “young man.”96 
Based on this evidence, Shager argued that the deficiencies triggering 
his termination were merely pretext for Lehnst’s discriminatory 
motive.97  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit considered whether Lehnst’s bias 
could be imputed to Asgrow.98 Asgrow argued that the neutral Career 
Path Committee, which apparently did not harbor any animosity 
toward older workers, shielded itself from Lehnst’s discrimination.99 
Initially, the Seventh Circuit discussed the common law agency 
principle that employers are liable for their supervisory employees’ 
discriminatory acts taken within their scope of authority.100 Yet that 
principle would hold Asgrow liable only if Lehnst had actually fired 
Shager.101 But, after all, the Career Path Committee made the official 
termination decision, not Lehnst.102  
However, the court proceeded to intensely examine the official 
decision, and, from this, the cat’s paw theory emerged. The Seventh 
Circuit concluded that the innocence of the Career Path Committee 
could not protect the company if the committee had acted “as the 
conduit of Lehnst’s prejudice—his cat’s paw.”103 The court observed 
that Lehnst’s bias and inaccurate portrayal of Shager’s performance 
“tainted” and “influenced” the committee’s decision to fire Shager.104 
Indeed, personnel committees often defer to a manager’s judgment 
because managers are in a better position to evaluate lower level 
                                                 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 401. 
98 Id. at 404. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 404–05. 
101 Id. at 405. 
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
104 Id. 
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employees.105 Given that the committee’s meeting regarding Shager’s 
termination was essentially perfunctory, Lehnst’s influence may have 
been decisive.106 As a result, Lehnst would have caused Shager’s 
discharge through his evaluations and recommendation.107 The 
Seventh Circuit concluded that Lehnst’s discriminatory action would 
be in violation of the ADEA and could be imputed to the company.108 
If the rule were otherwise, “the establishment of corporate committees 
authorized to rubber stamp personnel actions would preclude a finding 
of willfulness no matter how egregious the actions in question.”109  
 
C. Cat’s Paw Cases Generally 
 
Since Shager, nearly all of the circuit courts have followed the 
Seventh Circuit’s lead and adopted the cat’s paw doctrine. Although 
the Supreme Court has never endorsed the doctrine formally, it did 
recognize cat’s paw liability in principle in Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Products, Inc.110 In Reeves, the plaintiff did not present any 
evidence that the official decisionmaker was biased.111 Rather, the 
plaintiff showed that his supervisor, who did exhibit age-based 
animus, recommended the adverse employment action to the official 
decisionmaker.112 The biased supervisor happened to be the official 
decisionmaker’s husband and was described as yielding “absolute 
power” within the company.113 The Supreme Court characterized the 
plaintiff’s evidence as showing that the biased supervisor was 
effectively the “actual decisionmaker” and was “principally 
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 406. 
110 See generally 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
111 See id. at 146. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. at 151–52. 
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responsible” for the termination decision.114 As such, even though the 
official decisionmaker was bias-free, the Supreme Court upheld the 
jury verdict finding the employer liable based on the biased 
supervisor’s actions.115  
Although Reeves supports the doctrinal underpinnings of cat’s 
paw liability, its factual scenario represents only one type of cat’s paw 
case. At the Reeves end of the spectrum, the ultimate decisionmaker 
merely acts as a rubber stamp.116 That is, the biased employee acts as 
the de facto decisionmaker, even though an individual “higher in the 
organizational hierarchy actually fire[s] the plaintiff.”117 In this 
context, courts can quickly impose liability on the employer based on 
the biased employee’s unlawfully motivated actions.118 Similarly, “if 
the ultimate decisionmaker is aware that the recommendation was 
improperly motivated, then imposing liability on the employer readily 
follows.”119 
But cat’s paw cases differ in regard to the degree of control the 
biased employee exercises over the employment decision and, 
accordingly, they often become highly fact-intensive.120 Cat’s paw 
cases are more difficult when the ultimate decisionmaker does not 
simply rubber stamp the biased employee’s recommendation, yet does 
consider it when making the final decision.121 The employee’s bias 
                                                 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 152. 
116 White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 511–512. The rubber stamp terminology 
refers to the situation where the decision maker “gives perfunctory approval for an 
adverse employment action explicitly recommended by a biased subordinate.” 
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006). 
117 White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 511–12.  
118 Id. at 512. 
119 Id.  
120 Loren Gesinsky & Douglas B. Lipsky, When the Subordinate’s Bias 
Matters, 237 N.Y.L.J. 10 (May 21, 2007) (noting that the current circuit split may be 
explained by the “unique bundle of facts in each case that must be sifted and 
weighed in order to determine whether an employer’s complained of action occurred 
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination”).  
121 White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 512. 
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may be exhibited in many forms and may taint the ultimate decision in 
many ways.122 For example, the biased subordinate might deprive the 
ultimate decisionmaker of accurate data upon which to base its 
decision by concealing relevant information or even fabricating 
evidence.123 Or, more simply, the biased employee might put a certain 
“spin” on “decision-relevant events.”124 In determining whether to 
impose liability in this context, courts commonly evaluate whether the 
official decisionmaker conducted an “independent investigation.” 
Essentially, courts look to see whether the final decision was 
“sufficiently insulated from” bias, or whether the “taint injected into 
the process was removed before the ultimate decision was made.”125 It 
is this context—where the official decisionmaker does not simply 
rubber stamp but still considers the biased employee’s 
recommendation—that has divided the circuit courts. 
 
II. CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING THE LEVEL OF INFLUENCE 
NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH LIABILITY 
 
The circuit courts currently disagree about how much influence 
the biased employee must exercise over the decision to hold the 
employer liable.126 Although authorities agree about the circuit split’s 
existence, they disagree about where the circuits stand within this 
split.127 The approaches contain slight nuances, which makes it 
difficult to place the courts into distinct categories.128 Not only do 
                                                 
122 Id. at 514–15. 
123 Id. at 515. 
124 Id.  
125 Id.  
126 Ratliff, supra note 22, at 260. 
127 Compare Fowler, supra note 14, at 45 (characterizing the Russell decision 
as a “middle of the road approach”), with Eber, supra note 13, at 155 (stating that the 
Russell opinion demonstrates the lenient standard). 
128 Ratliff, supra note 22, at 260 (noting that “the subtleties of the various 
circuits’ opinions on cat’s paw liability often make it difficult to definitively place 
them within one category or another”). 
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inter-circuit subtleties exist, but intra-circuit subtleties exist, too.129 
Adding further confusion, the circuit courts often use imprecise 
language within a single opinion.130 Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit’s 
influence standard, the Fourth Circuit’s actual decisionmaker standard 
and the Tenth Circuit’s causation standard fairly represent the varying 
approaches, and each will be discussed in turn.  
 
A. Many of the Circuit Courts Have Adopted an  
“Influence” or “Input” Standard 
 
Many of the circuits impose liability when the biased employee 
merely influences the ultimate decision.131 For example, the Fifth 
Circuit requires the plaintiff to prove that the biased employee 
“possesse[d] leverage, or exert[ed] influence, over the titular 
decisionmaker.”132 In Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture, the fifty-
four year old plaintiff, Sandra Russell, argued that co-worker Steve 
Ciulla’s age-based animus should be imputed to the formal 
decisionmaker.133 Russell and Ciulla worked in equivalent positions at 
Homecare, and they reported to the same supervisor, Carol 
Jacobsen.134 Ciulla allegedly made many remarks indicating age-based 
bias; in fact, Russell had to buy earplugs for the office because of how 
frequently Ciulla referred to her as an “old bitch.”135 Ciulla eventually 
                                                 
129See Thomas, supra note 33, at 654 (comparing one Fifth Circuit case 
requiring a causal nexus and another Fifth Circuit case focusing on mere influence). 
130 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Brewer v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill., 
552 U.S. 825 (2007) (No. 06-1694) (stating that “the various circuit courts have used 
ambiguous and inconsistent language to describe the appropriate legal standard”). 
131 See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 303 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (Michael, J., dissenting) (noting that “[m]ost other circuits, in either 
mixed-motive or pretext cases, have held that when the discriminatory bias of a 
subordinate influences an employment decision, the employer will be charged with 
the subordinate’s bias”). 
132 Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (2000). 
133 Id. at 222, 227. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 226. 
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approached Jacobsen with an “ultimatum” that he would quit if 
Jacobsen did not terminate Russell.136 In addition, Ciulla suggested to 
others that he was responsible for Russell’s termination.137  
The Fifth Circuit considered whether Ciulla’s animus could be 
attributed to Homecare even though Ciulla did not fire Russell. Instead 
of simply looking for bias in the official decisionmaker, the court 
assessed whether other employees involved in the decision possessed 
bias.138 The court stated that it will impute an employee’s 
discriminatory intent if that employee influenced the official 
decisionmaker.139 In essence, the court refuses to “blindly accept the 
titular decisionmaker as the true decisionmaker.”140 
Evaluating Russell’s evidence under this framework, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that Ciulla “wielded sufficiently great ‘informal’ 
power within Homecare such that he effectively became the 
decisionmaker with respect to Russell’s termination.”141 Ciulla’s father 
was the chief executive officer of Homecare’s parent corporation, and 
Ciulla allegedly used this power to his advantage.142 When faced with 
Ciulla’s ultimatum, Jacobsen knew that Ciulla’s father controlled her 
budget and her job.143 The court decided that Ciulla’s ultimatum and 
age-based remarks influenced Jacobsen’s decision to terminate 
Russell.144  
Interestingly, even though the Fifth Circuit focused on mere 
influence, the court used terms connoting a higher degree of control at 
times. That is, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could 
have decided that Ciulla “contributed significantly” to the termination 
                                                 
136 Id. at 224. 
137 Id. at 226. 
138 Id. 
139 Id.  
140 Id.  
141 Id. at 227–28. 
142 Id. at 228. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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decision.145 Then, relying on the language of Reeves, the court stated 
that Ciulla was “principally responsible” for Russell’s termination.146 
Regardless of these apparent discrepancies in terminology, however, 
courts and commentaries consider the Fifth Circuit’s Russell opinion 
as demonstrating the mere influence approach.147  
Other circuits have adopted similar tests but used varying 
formulations of the amount of influence required. For example, the 
Second Circuit has required that the immediate supervisor possess 
“enormous influence” over the decision.148 Rather than focusing on 
the amount of influence, some courts emphasize the biased employee
involvement in the decisionmaking process. For instance, the Sixth 
Circuit has imposed liability where the biased subordinate “played a 
significant role” in the ultimate decisionmaking process.
’s 
                                                
149 And some 
courts examine both the ability to influence and the participation in the 
decisionmaking process. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit imposes 
liability if the biased employee “influenced, affected, or was involved 
in the adverse employment decision.”150  
 
B. The Fourth Circuit’s “Actual Decisionmaker” Standard  
 
The Fourth Circuit has adopted the strictest standard for 
establishing liability under the cat’s paw doctrine.151 In stark contrast 
to the influence standard, the Fourth Circuit’s approach requires that 
the biased employee “possessed such authority as to be viewed as the 
 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 See Eber, supra note 13, at 155–57 (describing the Russell decision as a 
model of the lenient standard). 
148 Rose v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001). 
149 Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 868 (6th Cir. 2003). 
150 Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007); see also 
Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d. Cir. 2001) 
(stating “[u]nder our case law, it is sufficient if those exhibiting discriminatory 
animus influenced or participated in the decision to terminate”). 
151 See generally Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 
(4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).  
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one principally responsible for the decision or the actual 
decisionmaker.”152 The Fourth Circuit initially set forth this rule in 
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc., where fifty-seven 
year old Ethel Hill claimed that she was terminated because of her sex 
and age.153 Two of the company’s supervisory managers fired Hill 
after she received three reprimands for violations of standard operating 
procedures.154 The managers based their decision on company policy 
that provided that three reprimands warranted discharge.155 Hill did 
not dispute the rules violations giving rise to her reprimands nor did 
she claim that the two supervisory managers responsible for her 
termination acted with discriminatory motives.156 Instead, Hill 
centered her claims on the alleged animus of Fultz, who was the safety 
inspector that reported the violations leading to her second and third 
reprimands.157 Hill asserted that Fultz reported Hill’s infractions 
because of his discriminatory bias against Hill.158 According to Hill, 
Fultz exhibited his bias by calling Hill a “useless old lady” who 
needed to retire, a “troubled old lady” and a “damn woman” on 
multiple occasions.159  
Initially, the Fourth Circuit noted that agency principles guided its 
determination of who could be considered a decisionmaker.160 The 
court commented that the other circuits that had already considered the 
cat’s paw doctrine did not give proper weight to the agency principles 
that are meant to limit its application.161 The court then turned its 
attention to the Supreme Court’s decision in Reeves, where the Court 
addressed an employer’s liability for the discriminatory motives of a 
                                                 
152 Id. at 291. 
153 Id. at 282. 
154 Id. 
155 Id.  
156 Id. at 282–83. 
157 Id. at 283. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 287. 
161 Id. at 289–90. 
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non-decisionmaker employee.162 The Fourth Circuit interpreted 
Reeves to stand for the proposition that the biased employee do
necessarily have to be the “‘formal decisionmaker’” to hold the 
employer liable.
es not 
ble 
                                                
163 But liability will exist only if the biased employee 
was “‘principally responsible’” for or the “‘actual decisionmaker’” 
behind the employment action.164 If not, the Fourth Circuit refuses to 
impose liability even when the biased employee exercised “substantial 
influence” over or played a “significant role” in the decision.165  
Hill, however, argued that Reeves did not define the outer 
contours of employer liability.166 Hill suggested a “substantial 
influence” test, which would hold an employer liable when the biased 
employee substantially influences a decision taken by the formal 
decisionmaker.167 The Fourth Circuit rejected both propositions.168 
The court reasoned that the antidiscrimination statutes and applica
Supreme Court precedent did not allow such a broad reach of 
employer liability.169  
In dissent, Judge Michael remarked that the majority’s strict 
standard “puts [the Fourth Circuit] at odds with virtually every other 
circuit” while simultaneously rendering Title VII and the ADEA 
 
162 Id. at 288. 
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 288–89. 
165 Id. at 291. 
166 Id. at 289. 
167 Id. The EEOC also supported Hill’s proposed test. Id. The Fourth Circuit 
stated that the EEOC asked for an even broader holding under the substantially 
influence test. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the EEOC’s argument as 
holding an employer liable “whenever the influence is sufficient to be considered a 
cause of the employment action, even if the formal decisionmaker did not simply 
rubber-stamp the biased subordinate’s recommendation.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
For arguments in further support of the substantially influence test, see Tim Davis, 
Beyond the Cat’s Paw: An Argument for Adopting a “Substantially Influences” 
Standard for Title VII and ADEA Liability, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 247 (2007).  
168 Hill, 354 F.3d at 289. 
169 Id.  
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“essentially toothless.”170 Unlike the majority, Judge Michael would 
have adopted Hill’s proposed substantially influence test.171 Judge 
Michael argued that the majority erred by placing excessive emphasis 
on agency principles when it should have focused on causation.172 
Causation, unlike agency, is firmly rooted in the statutory language of 
Title VII and the ADEA.173 That is, the statutes’ impose liability on 
employers when the adverse employment action was taken “because 
of” a prohibited characteristic.174 Judge Michael also criticized the 
majority’s analysis of and reliance on Reeves.175 Judge Michael 
concluded that the majority’s actual decisionmaker rule unnecessarily 
removes Title VII and the ADEA’s protections from an entire class of 
discrimination cases.176 
 
C. The Tenth Circuit’s Causation Standard 
 
Applying a more centrist approach, the Tenth Circuit imposes 
liability when the biased employee’s actions cause the adverse 
employment decision.177 In EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling 
Company of Los Angeles, the plaintiff, Stephen Peters, alleged that he 
was terminated because of his race.178 Peters, an African-American, 
worked as a merchandiser at BCI’s Albuqeurque, New Mexico facility 
where more than sixty percent of the employees were Hispanic.179 Jeff 
Katt, an account manager, and Cesar Grado, a district sales manager, 
                                                 
170 Id. at 299, 301 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
171 Id. at 304. 
172 Id. at 301. 
173 Id. at 302. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 302–04. 
176 Id. at 304. 
177 EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 487–88 (10th 
Cir. 2006). 
178 Id. at 478.  
179 Id.  
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supervised Peters.180 Although Grado handled scheduling, 
merchandisers often called in sick to their own account managers, 
rather than to Grado.181 Grado also monitored and evaluated the 
employees under his supervision.182 Grado did not have the authority 
to make discipline or termination decisions, but he did have the 
discretion to notify the human resources department of any 
disciplinary information.183 The human resources department was 
ultimately in charge of disciplinary action.184  
The incident giving rise to Peters’ termination surrounded a busy 
weekend where Grado directed Katt to inform Peters that Peters had to 
work on Sunday, his day off.185 Upon notification, Peters told Katt that 
he could not work because he had plans.186 Grado asked the human 
resources department whether he could force Peters to work on his day 
off.187 Pat Edgar, a human resources employee, replied that Grado 
should tell Peters that working on Sunday was a “direct order” and 
failure to comply would amount to insubordination, which constituted 
grounds for termination.188 After Grado relayed this information to 
Peters, Peters again replied that he had plans and angrily told Grado 
that his plans were “none of [Grado’s] business.”189 The conservation 
ended with Peters saying “[d]o what [you] got to do and I’ll do what I 
got to do.”190 Peters, however, became sick that Saturday, forcing him 
to cancel his Sunday plans and seek urgent care health care.191 Peters 
called and informed Katt that he could not work that Sunday because 
                                                 
180 Id.  
181 Id.  
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 479.  
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id.  
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 480. 
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of his illness.192 After Peters failed to work on Sunday, Edgar spoke 
with other human resources personnel, as well as Grado.193 Edgar 
decided to terminate Peters.194 Edgar claimed her primary reason for 
terminating Peters was his behavior toward Grado, not for failing to 
work.195 
Thereafter, Peters filed a charge with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the EEOC filed suit on his 
behalf, alleging that his termination was due to racial 
discrimination.196 The EEOC argued that even though Edgar was the 
sole decisionmaker and was unaware that Peters was black, “Grado 
harbored racial animus toward African American employees and . . . 
this bias [should be] imputed to BCI because of Grado’s substantial 
involvement in the termination process as Peters’ supervisor and 
Edgar’s sole source of information about the events on which BCI 
alleges the termination was primarily based.”197 The EEOC presented 
affidavits from other BCI employees stating that Grado treated 
African-American employees worse than employees of other races.198 
Grado also allegedly made race-based remarks at the workplace.199  
Additionally, the EEOC compared Grado’s treatment of Peters to 
his treatment of a Hispanic employee in a similar situation.200 During 
a different busy weekend, Grado told Katt to direct Monica Lovato, a
Hispanic merchandiser, to work her day off.
 
                                                
201 Lovato replied that she 
would be celebrating her birthday on those days but Katt insisted that 
she was required to work.202 Lovato failed to show up to work, even 
 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 482. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
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after being paged repeatedly.203 Yet Grado never inquired about 
Lovato’s reasons for missing work, and instead, Grado stated “you 
can’t make somebody work one of their days off.”204 The human 
resources department never disciplined Lovato for this incident.205  
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether Grado’s alleged 
racial bias could be imputed to BCI under the cat’s paw theory of 
liability.206 The Tenth Circuit noted that the circuits disagreed about 
the level of control that a biased employee must exert over the 
decision to warrant liability.207 The court described a “lenient” 
approach that holds employers liable so long as the biased employee 
exercised any level of influence.208 The Tenth Circuit concluded that 
the lenient approach was inconsistent with agency principles, 
improperly eliminated the element of causation, and weakened the 
deterrent effect of cat’s paw liability.209 Thus, the court decided that 
plaintiffs must prove more than mere influence over the 
decisionmaking process.210 
Turning to the opposite end of the spectrum, the Tenth Circuit also 
disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s strict standard because it 
misconstrued the Supreme Court’s holding in Reeves.211 The court 
reasoned that the Reeves Court did not intend for the phrase “actual 
decisionmaker” to prescribe the outer contours of liability, but, rather, 
the Supreme Court used the phrase to describe the employee’s 
evidence.212 In essence, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Fourth 
                                                 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 482–83. 
205 Id. at 483. 
206 Id. at 484. 
207 Id. at 486. 
208 Id.  
209 Id. at 486–87. 
210 Id. 
211 Id.  
212 Id. 
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Circuit took the cat’s paw metaphor “too literally in deriving its total-
control-over-the-decision standard.”213 
The court held that plaintiffs must prove that “the biased 
subordinate’s discriminatory reports, recommendation, or other actions 
caused the adverse employment action.”214 Not only does this rule 
comply with agency principles, the court reasoned, but courts require a 
comparable causation standard in analogous workplace discrimination 
claims.215 Although the Tenth Circuit clearly adopted a causation-
based approach, the court never explicitly defined “cause,” nor did it 
state what type of causation was required. The court’s omission raises 
serious doctrinal concerns because several different standards of 
causation exist. 
However, the Tenth Circuit did specify that the official 
decisionmaker can break the causal connection by conducting an 
independent investigation into the allegations against the employee.216 
In fact, the court stated that simply asking the affected employees for 
their version of the events would constitute an independent 
investigation.217 But in the case at bar, Edgar’s cursory review of 
Peter’s personnel file did not amount to an independent 
investigation.218 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the EEOC presented 
sufficient evidence that Grado’s biased account of his conversation 
with Peters caused Peter’s termination.219  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
213 Id. at 488. 
214 Id.  
215 Id. at 487–88. Notably, the Tenth Circuit held that the cat’s paw doctrine 
did not require an explicit recommendation from the biased subordinate to fire the 
plaintiff. Id. at 488. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 492. 
219 Id. at 491. 
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III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT: WHERE DOES IT STAND? 
 
The Seventh Circuit has been pegged with the introduction of the 
cat’s paw doctrine, and yet it has inconsistently applied the doctrine. 
The court has even admitted its ambiguous ways, stating “our 
approach to Title VII cases involving an employee’s influence over a 
decision maker has not always been completely clear.”220 The Seventh 
Circuit’s first cat’s paw case, Shager, characterized the subordinate’s 
influence as “decisive” and evaluated the “causal link” between the 
subordinate’s bias and Shager’s discharge.221 Since Shager, the 
Seventh Circuit has used various standards in cat’s paw cases. At times 
the court has applied a more lenient standard, but recently the court 
has required a much higher level of control.222 In fact, the Seventh 
Circuit stated in 2007 that “[o]ur opinions have sometimes suggested 
that not only significant influence, but any influence over an 
employment decision is sufficient to impose Title VII liability on an 
employer.”223 
For example, in Dey v. Colt Construction and Development 
Company, the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs can defeat summary 
judgment by showing that “an employee with discriminatory animus 
provided factual information or other input that may have affected the 
adverse employment action.”224 The plaintiff, Dey, filed suit arguing 
that she was terminated in retaliation for her sexual harassment 
complaints against the company’s vice president and general counsel, 
                                                 
220 Brewer v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 2007). 
221 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). 
222 Compare Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1994), 
with Brewer, 479 F.3d 908.  
223 Brewer, 479 F.3d at 919. 
224 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, 
Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1400 (7th Cir. 1997) (the court stated that “the prejudices of an 
employee, normally a subordinate but here a coequal, are imputed to the employee 
who has formal authority over the plaintiff’s job . . . where the subordinate, by 
concealing relevant information from the decisionmaking employee or feeding false 
information to him, is able to influence the decision”); Hoffman v. MCA, Inc., 144 
F.3d 1117, 1121–22 (7th Cir. 1998) (“tainted the decision maker’s judgment”). 
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Chernoff.225 However, the official decisionmaker, Isray, was unaware 
of Dey’s complaints.226 Accordingly, the company claimed that no 
causal link existed between Dey’s protected activity and her 
termination.227 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the 
official decisionmaker was unaware of Dey’s protected activity, but 
further observed that Chernoff participated in the meeting discussing 
Dey’s termination.228 During the meeting, Isray had asked Chernoff 
about Dey’s performance.229 Chernoff replied that her performance 
was unsatisfactory and that he believed she should be terminated.230 
From this, the court concluded that, even if Isray was unaware of the 
complaints, “those complaints may have affected Chernoff's 
unflattering assessment of her job performance” and “Chernoff's 
participation may have introduced a discriminatory animus into Isray's 
decision.”231  
In Lust v. Sealy, Inc., the Seventh Circuit explicitly renounced the 
Fourth Circuit’s actual decisionmaker standard and stated that the 
strict rule was not in line with the Seventh Circuit’s view.232 The 
Seventh Circuit explained that courts should not interpret the cat’s paw 
formula too literally.233 In fact, if the cat’s paw analogy was “taken 
even semi-literally it would be inconsistent with the normal analysis of 
causal issues in tort litigation.”234 
Yet in 2007, just a few years later, the Seventh Circuit arguably 
aligned itself with the Fourth Circuit’s stringent standard. The Seventh 
Circuit held that liability should exist only when the biased employee 
                                                 
225 Dey, 28 F.3d at 1450. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 1459. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 1459–1460. 
232 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
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exercises “singular influence” over the official decisionmaker.235 In 
Brewer, Lonnell Brewer, an African-American, brought a Title VII 
action against the University of Illinois alleging that he was terminated 
from his job and dismissed from his master’s program because of his 
race.236 Brewer invoked the cat’s paw theory to impute the 
discriminatory bias of his supervisor, Kerrin Thompson, to the 
University.237  
The events leading to Brewer’s termination involved a scandal 
regarding his parking pass.238 When Brewer began his assistantship, 
Thompson told him that he could park anywhere. 239After receiving a 
ticket for a broken pass, Brewer went to the university’s parking 
services to get a replacement parking sticker.240 Parking services 
noticed that Brewer’s parking application contained inaccurate 
information.241 Brewer went to speak with Thompson about the issue, 
and Thompson became “irate,” telling Brewer he should have never 
gone to the parking services office because Thompson had lied in the 
application to be able to get Brewer the parking tag.242 After Brewer 
reminded Thompson that she told him he could park anywhere, she 
furiously stated that she was “through with you people.”243 And as 
Brewer left her office, Thompson yelled out “I have had it with you 
nigger, get my tag!”244 The program director, Denise Hendricks, 
terminated Brewer because of the parking incident.245 Brewer argued 
                                                 
235 See Brewer, 479 F.3d at 917–18. 
236 Id. at 909. 
237 Id. at 916–17. 
238 Id. at 909. Judge Cudahy interestingly introduced the case by stating that it 
“concerns the corrupt, Machiavellian world of permit parking at the University of 
Illinois’s Urbana-Champaign campus, and the ill fortune of a student who became 
involved in it.” Id. 
239 Id. at 910. 
240 Id. at 913. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Id.  
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
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that racial bias motivated Thompson’s failure to tell Hendricks that she 
had given Brewer permission to park anywhere, and Brewer contended 
that this omission caused his termination.246  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit analyzed whether the University 
could be liable for Thompson’s racially motivated omission.247 The 
court stated that what other employees say to each other typically does 
not constitute an adverse employment action.248 However, in certain 
contexts, such as a performance review, what one employee says or 
does not say about another can control an employee’s wages, affect 
chances of promotion or even trigger termination.249 The court 
decided that Thompson’s withholding of information influenced 
Hendricks’s decision to fire 250Brewer.   
                                                
But an employee’s minimal amount of influence does not warrant 
liability; rather, the biased employee must exercise singular 
influence.251 The Seventh Circuit explained that the biased employee 
must “possess so much influence as to basically be herself the true 
‘functional[ ] . . . decision-maker.’”252 Focusing on the analogy 
underlying the doctrine, the court stated that the functional 
decisionmaker must be nothing more than the biased employee’s cat’s 
paw.253 The court described such a situation as one where the 
functional decisionmaker entirely depends on another employee to 
“supply the information on which to base that decision.”254 Liability 
will not exist as long as the decisionmaker does not rely solely on the 
biased employee’s information, even if she heavily relies on it.255  
 
246 Id. at 916. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 917. 
249 Id.  
250 Id. 
251 Id.  
252 Id. (quoting Little v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir. 
2004)). 
253 Id. at 917–18. 
254 Id. at 918. 
255 Id. at 919. 
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Similarly, the court held that an employer can prevent liability by 
conducting an investigation into the facts relevant to the decision.256 
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Hendricks looked into the 
situation herself and did not entirely rely on the information that 
Thompson told her.257 Notably, the court stated that when faced with 
two conflicting stories, an employer satisfies the independent 
investigation defense by simply considering both stories.258 The court 
also suggested Brewer had a duty to tell Hendricks that Thompson was 
withholding information to trigger further investigation.259  
The Seventh Circuit then turned to address the conflict between 
the singular influence approach and its prior precedent.260 To the 
extent that previous cases had suggested that any influence establishes 
liability, the court stated those cases were doubtful dicta and simply 
involved “imprecise language.”261 Further, the court compared those 
cases with numerous others where the court upheld summary 
judgment when a biased employee may have exercised potential, but 
slight, influence over the decision.262  
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its singular 
influence standard in an employment discrimination case arising under 
the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights 
Act.263 In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the plaintiff, Vincent Staub, 
alleged that he was terminated because of his military association and 
the reasons given for his termination—insubordination, shirking, and 
attitude problems—were merely pretext.264 As an Army reservist, 
Staub had military obligations one weekend per month and two weeks 
                                                 
256 Id. at 918.  
257Id. at 919. 
258Id. at 918.  
259 Id. at 919. 
260 Id.  
261 Id.  
262 Id. at 919–20. 
263 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2009); 38 U.S.C. 
§§ 4301–4333 (2006).  
264 Staub, 560 F.3d at 650–51. 
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in the summer.265 Janice Mulally, Staub’s supervisor in charge of 
scheduling, often ignored Staub’s requests for time off, calling his 
military duties “bullshit.”266 On one occasion, Mulally issued Staub a 
written warning for allegedly disobeying instructions.267 A few months 
later, a coworker complained that Staub was often unavailable.268 
Later, Staub’s supervisor was unable to locate him, in violation of 
Mulally’s instruction to notify her of his location.269 After this episode, 
Linda Buck, the vice president of human resources, terminated 
Staub.270 Buck stated that without the three prior incidents—Mulally’s 
warning, the coworker’s complaint and Staub’s “disappearance”—she 
would not have fired Staub.271 
Staub invoked the cat’s paw theory to impute Mulally’s animus to 
Buck.272 Staub contended that Mulally fed false information to Buck 
because of her discriminatory bias and that Buck relied on this 
information in deciding to terminate Staub.273 Staub convinced a jury 
of this theory and obtained a verdict in his favor.274 On appeal, 
however, the Seventh Circuit reversed the jury verdict because of 
insufficient evidence.275 The court applied the same rule as it did in 
Brewer, namely, whether the biased employee exercised singular 
influence over the official decisionmaker.276 Unless the ultimate 
decisionmaker held that title only nominally, liability will not exist.277 
Again, drawing from the underlying analogy, the Seventh Circuit 
                                                 
265 Id. at 651. 
266 Id. at 651–52.  
267 Id. at 653. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 654. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 655. 
273 Id. at 655. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. at 657. 
276 Id. at 656. 
277 Id.  
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stated “true to the fable, [a cat’s paw case] requires a blind reliance, 
the stuff of ‘singular influence.’ ”278 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s 
precedent demonstrates how courts have struggled with the proper 
application of the cat’s paw doctrine over the past twenty years. 
 
IV. THE APPROPRIATE REACH OF CAT’S PAW LIABILITY 
 
The circuits’ varying standards apparently results from just how 
literally courts interpret the cat’s paw analogy. On the one hand, courts 
applying the influence standard hardly focus on the analogy, using it as 
a guidepost at most. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit has taken 
the metaphor quite literally in “deriving its total-control-over-the-
actual-decision standard.”279 The Tenth Circuit expressly disagrees 
with an approach that limits liability to cases closely resembling the 
cat’s paw.280 Rather, the Tenth Circuit described its view of the 
analogy by stating, “[s]tripped of their metaphors, subordinate bias 
claims simply recognize that many companies separate the 
decisonmaking function from the investigation and reporting 
functions, and that racial bias can taint any of those functions.”281 And 
in Staub, the Seventh Circuit limited liability to cases that are “true to 
the fable.”282 
Ultimately, a comparison of each circuit’s unique approach is 
more than a semantic exercise.283 The particular standard can affect 
the outcome of the case, whether it is resolved at the summary 
judgment level or proceeds to trial.284 Thus, without a uniform 
standard, “similarly situated parties receive different treatment 
                                                 
278 Id. at 659 (quoting Brewer v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 
917 (7th Cir. 2007).  
279 EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th Cir. 
2006). 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
282 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009). 
283 Thomas, supra note 33, at 655. 
284 Id.  
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depending on where they bring their cases.”285 Courts need to adopt a 
coherent and uniform standard for deciding these common cases. In 
doing so, this section offers three suggestions. First, courts should use 
a motivating factor standard of causation in determining liability
than focusing on vague formulations of influence. Second, courts nee
to scrutinize whether an independent investigation truly breaks the 
causal connection. Third, courts should apply agency principles to 
limit the imposition of vicarious liability in this c
 rather 
d 
ontext.  
                                                
 
A. Courts Should Adopt the Standard of Motivating Factor Causation 
to Determine the Requisite Level of Control that a Biased Employee 
Must Exercise in Order to Impose Liability  
 
The element of causation constitutes one of the central issues in 
delineating the appropriate reach of cat’s paw liability.286 As in any 
other disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff in a cat’s paw case must 
demonstrate a causal connection between the prohibited characteristic 
and the challenged action.287 Although the current circuit split focuses 
on the requisite degree of influence that the biased employee must 
exercise, the courts’ various formulations, as a practical matter, relate 
to the standard of causation that the courts are seeking to impose.288 
Specifically, the lenient influence approach requires only a minimal 
level of causation, while the strict actual decisionmaker and singular 
influence standards require a much higher level of causation. Even the 
courts that claim to use a causation-based approach do not define 
causation nor indicate what causation standard they require. However, 
the lack of a unified causation standard in cat’s paw cases should come 
as no surprise because, as discussed in Section I.A, employment 
discrimination law, on the whole, suffers from the same deficiency.289 
 
285 Eber, supra note 13, at 187. 
286 White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 511. 
287 Id. 
288 Thomas, supra note 33, at 659. 
289 Katz I, supra note 36, at 491–93. Attempting to make sense of the causation 
doctrine, Professor Katz has categorized the six most prominent formulations as 
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 To resolve the ambiguity, courts should adopt the motivating 
factor causation standard to determine when employers should be held 
liable for several reasons. First, the statutory language of Title VII 
explicitly calls for a motivating factor test.290 Congress amended Title 
VII so that instead of requiring that the adverse employment action 
was taken “because of” a prohibited characteristic, now the prohibited 
characteristic need only be a “motivating factor.”291 Prior to the 1991 
amendment, the “because of” language had been interpreted to require 
but-for causation.292 The tort concept of but-for causation means that a 
factor is considered necessary to an event if, but for its existence, the 
event would not have taken place when it did.293 The Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Price Waterhouse, which triggered the 1991 Amendments, 
discussed the problems with requiring plaintiffs to prove but-for 
causation, especially in disparate treatment cases.294 As a result, 
scholars agree that the change to the motivating factor test 
demonstrates Congress’ intent to remove the standard of but-for 
causation.295 Therefore, the strict principally responsible and singular 
influence standards of causation contradict the statutory language of 
Title VII and correspondingly Congress’ intent. By requiring that the 
                                                                                                                   
follows: (1) the “motivating factor” test from the 1991 Act and Price Waterhouse; 
(2) the “same action” formulation also from the 1991 Act; (3) the “but for” test; (4) 
the “determinative influence” or “determinative factor” formulation; (5) the “a role,” 
“a cause,” and “a factor” test; and (6) the “substantial factor” test. Id. at 500–01. 
290 See Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 402.  
291 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Leigh A. Van Ostrand, A Close Look at ADEA 
Mixed-Motives Claims and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 399, 417–18 (2009). 
292 See White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 505.  
293 Katz I, supra note 36, at 496, 501. 
294 Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 
643, 655–58 (2008) [hereinafter Katz II] (discussing how plaintiffs have problems 
getting access to the evidence that is necessary to prove but for causation because it 
is under the control of the defendant, that is, it is “often in the head of the decision-
maker”). 
295 Katz I, supra note 36, at 505–06. 
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biased subordinate serve as the “actual decisionmaker,” the strict 
causation standards requires, at a minimum, but-for causation.296 
In place of but-for causation, Title VII now requires that the 
prohibited characteristic be a “motivating factor” in the decision.297 
Congress definitely enacted the motivating factor test to require a less 
onerous causation standard that but-for causation.298 Although the 
motivating factor language does not constitute a traditional causation 
concept, legislative history suggests that it most likely refers to the tort 
standard of minimal causation.299 Minimal causation exists when a 
factor does not rise to the level of necessity, but does have some causal 
influence on the event in question.300  
However, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gross 
v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the motivating factor standard 
apparently only applies in Title VII cat’s paw cases.301 Yet strong 
arguments exist that the same standard should be used in relation to all 
of the antidiscrimination statutes that use the “because of” 
language.302 As Justice Stevens noted in his Gross dissent, Price 
Waterhouse interpreted the “because of” language as requiring the 
motivating factor test and not but-for causation.303 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court has historically applied Title VII precedent to ADEA 
                                                 
296 Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 402. 
297 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
298 See Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2357 (2009) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that Price Waterhouse repudiated the but-for 
standard twenty years ago and Congress’ response also demonstrates that but-for 
causation is not necessary); Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 402–03. 
299 Katz I, supra note 36, at 505–06. 
300 Id. at 498–99. 
301 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
302See Katz II, supra note 294, at 667–73 (outlining numerous reasons why the 
motivating factor interpretation of “because of” should be applied to 
antidiscrimination statutes other than Title VII, such as an assumption of uniformity, 
the uniform-meaning canon of statutory construction, express statement of 
congressional intent and the historical context of the 1991 Amendment). 
303 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (stating, “[t]o 
construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for’ causation is to 
misunderstand them”). 
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cases.304 And with respect to cat’s paw cases specifically, courts have
consistently assumed that the same legal standard applies to a
antidiscrimination statutes.
 
ll of the 
 
tion’s 
und
 
l 
 
 
ive as 
ve 
                                                
305 Unfortunately, the current fragmented 
treatment of antidiscrimination statutes creates additional problems in
attempting to create a unified standard for the cat’s paw doctrine. 
Nonetheless, the best solution should still focus on causation.  
In addition to statutory language, antidiscrimination legisla
erlying goals support motivating factor causation. Congress 
enacted antidiscrimination statutes to deter discrimination and to
provide remedies to discrimination victims.306 The stringent actua
decisionmaker and singular influence standards counter the statutes’
deterrent purpose. Knowing they can escape liability so long as the 
biased employee did not completely control the decision, employers
have little incentive to proactively eliminate discrimination in their 
workplaces.307 In fact, the strict rules may encourage employers to 
design policies of “willful blindness” where the decisionmaking 
process “intentionally mask[s] the underlying discriminatory mot
a basis to avoid liability.”308 At the same time, overly lenient standards 
may not further the deterrent goal either. If employers can be liable 
based on an insignificant amount of biased influence, they may belie
that preventative measures are simply fruitless.309 A causation-based 
standard forges a middle ground that encourages employers to 
implement policies that prevent, not cover up, discrimination. 
 
304 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); see also 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (applying 
Title VII principles to ADEA case). 
305 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647 
(7th Cir. 2009) (No. 09-400), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2009/11/09-400_pet1.pdf. 
306 Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 403. 
307 Keaton Wong, Comment, Weighing Influence: Employment Discrimination 
and the Theory of Subordinate Bias Liability, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1729, 1753–54 
(2008). 
308 Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 404. 
309 Eber, supra note 13, at 177–78. 
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A causation-based approach also advances the remedial purpose 
of antidiscrimination. A less onerous standard, like motivating factor 
causation, makes it easier for plaintiffs to defeat summary judgment 
and allow a jury to decide whether the discriminatory conduct caused 
the employment decision.310 Permitting greater access to a jury is 
important because federal antidiscrimination statutes are remedial in 
nature and, as such, should be broadly construed to fulfill their 
purposes.311 Strict standards of causation, like those of the Fourth and 
Seventh Circuit, ignore the remedial purpose of antidiscrimination 
statutes by imposing such a high hurdle.312 The actual decisionmaker 
and singular influence rules effectively remove an entire category of 
plaintiffs from the protections of antidiscrimination legislation.313 
Moreover, a causation-based standard properly maintains the 
element of causation. Despite the ambiguities about the standard of 
causation, there is no doubt that the antidiscrimination statutes require 
a causal connection between the unlawful bias and the challenged 
decision.314 The lenient approach may inappropriately remove the 
causation requirement.315 Courts may impose liability based on a 
trivial amount of influence or involvement and presume that causation 
exists. Thus, the lenient standard’s failure to address the element of 
causation constitutes a significant flaw. A motivating factor standard, 
however, does not eliminate a requirement of causation. Minimal 
causation still requires that the discriminatory intent have a causal 
influence on the adverse employment action, but it does not require 
that the intent rise to the level of “but for” causation.  
                                                 
310 Id. at 175.  
311 Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 403. 
312 Id. 
313 Kaler, supra note 2, at 1087. 
314 White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 503–05. 
315 EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 486–87 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998) as 
construing Title VII “to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for 
harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority” (emphasis in original)). 
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Finally, courts can uniformly understand and apply traditional tort 
principles of causation.316 Courts have struggled in applying the vague 
standards enunciated by many of the circuit courts. The blurred 
boundaries between whether a biased employee was the “actual 
decisionmaker,” the one “principally responsible,” exercised “singular 
influence,” or “provided input” causes illogical results.317 Instead of 
assessing ambiguous terminology, courts should explicitly evaluate the 
element of causation. Tort causation principles are “well-defined and 
widely understood by courts.” 318 Thus, in contrast to the influence 
and actual decisionmaker approaches, the causation-based stand
certainly focuses on the appropriate issue. But because several 
different causation standards exist in employment discrimination law, 
courts need to clarify what standard of causation they require. In doing 
so, courts should adopt the motivating factor standard because it 
comes straight from the language of Title VII, maintains an element of 
causation and provides a uniform formulation that courts can readily 
apply. In sum, motivating factor causation offers the best solution to 
the circuit split over the level of control that the biased employee must 
exercise over the actual decisionmaker.  
ard 
                                                
 
B. “Independent” Investigations: When Should They Be Permitted to 
Break the Causal Connection? 
 
Closely related to the standard of causation, the independent 
investigation defense constitutes another important issue in the cat’s 
paw context. An independent investigation “serves to replace the 
influence of a subordinate’s bias with the untainted determination of 
an unbiased ultimate decisionmaker.”319 By investigating the 
circumstances relevant to the decision, the official decisionmaker can 
remove the taint of discrimination brought in by the biased employee’s 
 
316 Eber, supra note 13, at 184. 
317 See id. 
318 Id. 
319 Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 413–14. 
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actions and thereby break the chain of causation.320 Nearly all of the 
circuit courts allow an employer to escape liability by conducting an 
independent investigation.321 Yet despite this general agreement, the 
circuits are again divided about the meaning of “independent 
investigation.”322  
More precisely, the courts disagree about the type of investigation 
that employers must conduct to remove the taint of discrimination.323 
For example, the Tenth Circuit in BCI stated that merely asking the 
affected employee for his side of the story suffices.324 The Seventh 
Circuit in Brewer stated that “[i]t does not matter that, in a particular 
situation, much of the information has come from a potentially biased 
source, so long as the decision maker does not . . . limit her 
investigation to information from the biased source.”325 The Seventh 
Circuit also suggested that the affected employee had a duty to inform 
the official decisionmaker of any additional facts that would warrant 
further investigation.326 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that an 
                                                 
320 Id. at 412. 
321 See, e.g., Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007); EEOC v. 
BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th Cir. 2006); Cariglia v. 
Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 363 F.3d 77, 87 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004); Willis v. Marion 
County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1997); Long v. Eastfield Coll., 
88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996).  
322 Ratliff, supra note 22, at 269. 
323 Id. 
324  BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 488. The First and Eleventh Circuits have 
adopted a similar view. Cariglia v. Hertz Equipment Rental Corp., 363 F.3d 77, 87 
n.4 (1st Cir. 2004 ) (stating that its decision to remand the case for additional 
findings may have been different if the plaintiff had been given an opportunity to 
address the allegations against him); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 
1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that an employer should be absolved from 
liability when “the employer makes an effort to determine the employee’s side of the 
story”).  
325 479 F.3d at 918.  
326 479 F.3d 919; see also Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 
F.3d 277, 293–94 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (noting that the employee failed to 
dispute any of her biased supervisor’s negative evaluations and that “it was 
incumbent upon her to dispute any basis for the reprimand at that time if she 
intended to complain later”); but see Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dept., 
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investigation does not necessarily sever the causal link between the 
alleged bias and the decision.327 Instead, the Fifth Circuit allows the 
jury to determine whether the ultimate decision was based on the 
employer’s independent investigation.328 As an example of a clearly 
sufficient effort, the investigation in Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa 
consisted of a three-day hearing where the employee was permitted to 
present evidence and witnesses on his behalf.329 Courts have given 
less attention to steps that do not constitute an independent 
investigation. But the Tenth Circuit did find a basic review o
affected employee’s personnel file unsatisfac 330
f the 
tory.   
                                                                                                                  
The uncertainty relating to independent investigations burdens all 
types of employers.331 Employers increasingly vest decisionmaking 
authority in lower-level employees and allow those employees to base 
their decisions on information provided by subordinates.332 With the 
varying standards for cat’s paw liability, employers are unsure how to 
tailor their decisionmaking structure so as to avoid liability.333 In 
particular, large employers with centralized personnel departments 
need help designing procedures that expose potential bias.334 And 
smaller employers with fewer resources also need to know “how much 
time and money must be put into an investigation.”335  
 
549 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding employer liable even though the employee 
failed to raise his supervisor’s racial bias during an investigation conducted by a 
subordinate manager). 
327 Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 346–47 (5th Cir. 2002). 
328 Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Kramer 
v. Logan Sch. Dist. No. R-1, 157 F.3d 620, 622–24 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
issue of whether the school board rubber stamped a recommendation for non-
renewal was “appropriately presented to the jury”).  
329 Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999). 
330450 F.3d, 476, 492–93 (10th Cir. 2006).  
331 Santoro, supra note 37, at 835. 
332 Eber, supra note 13, at 188. 
333 Id. 
334 Santoro, supra note 37, at 835. 
335 Id. 
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Although the independent investigation doctrine may be 
theoretically sound, several problems exist with the defense in its 
current state. First, many circuits allow too low of a level of 
investigation to break the causal connection. By characterizing the 
mere act of asking employees for their version of the events as an 
independent investigation, courts too quickly assume that this action 
will remove the discriminatory taint. The Seventh Circuit in Brewer 
stated that an independent investigation contains “some affirmative act 
by the decision maker to come to his own decision.”336 Yet the court 
held that the decisionmaker’s simple action of looking at the altered 
parking sticker, which served as the impetus for the employee’s 
termination, constituted such an affirmative action.337 
Courts should be wary in concluding that such cursory actions 
constitute an independent investigation. Because the defense 
fundamentally relates to causation, it is vital that courts examine 
whether the investigation truly breaks the connection between the 
employee’s bias and the ultimate decision.338 Thus, courts should not 
blindly consider any perfunctory employer action an independent 
investigation, but, instead, should more carefully scrutinize the 
employer’s steps. In its merits brief to the Supreme Court, the EEOC 
suggested that the “more thorough, balanced, and truly independent 
the investigation, the more likely the termination will be the result of 
the investigation rather than the discriminatory input.”339  
 In addition to the low threshold of what satisfies the defense, 
another problem relates to whether an investigation can ever truly be 
independent in the cat’s paw context. The circuit courts have assumed 
that an impartial inquiry is possible and have ignored the role of 
expectancy confirmation bias.340 Expectancy confirmation bias, a 
                                                 
336 Brewer v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 2007). 
337 Id. 
338 Eber, supra note 13, at 194–95. 
339 Brief of Respondent at 35, EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 
450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006) (No. 06–341), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007). 
340 Recent Cases, Employment Law -- Title VII -- Tenth Circuit Clarifies 
Causation Standard for Subordinate Bias Claims, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1699, 1703 
(2007). 
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social psychology concept, teaches that after a recommendation has 
been made, the recommendation will serve as a prior theory or a 
tentative hypothesis.341 More specifically, a biased employee’s 
recommendation “can reasonably be expected to influence the ultimate 
decision maker’s judgment in a recommendation-consistent direction, 
even if he conducts his own investigation.”342  
Expectancies also affect the amount and type of information that 
individuals seek before making a final decision.343 Because the 
decisionmaker may be anchored to a presumption of guilt, the 
decisionmaker may investigate the underlying events in a way that 
uncovers only expectation-confirming evidence.344 Further, 
decisionmakers may ask asymmetric questions that allow confirmation 
of their hypotheses.345 Not only does expectancy confirmation bias 
influence the investigation, but it also affects how individuals process 
information once uncovered. The decisionmaker will likely consider 
theory-confirming evidence more probative than any theory-
disconfirming evidence. 346 Social science research demonstrates that 
the decisionmaker may “remember the strengths of confirming 
evidence but the weaknesses of disconfirming evidence . . . [and] 
accept confirming evidence at face value while scrutinizing 
disconfirming evidence hypercritically.”347 Individuals also process 
expectancy-confirming information more easily.348 
                                                 
341 White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 524. For a detailed description of the 
classic studies illustrating the expectancy confirmation bias, see id. at 525. 
342 Id. at 524. 
343 Recent Cases, supra note 340, at 1704. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. 
346 White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 525–26. 
347 Recent Cases, supra note 340, at 1704–05 (quoting Charles G. Lord et. al., 
Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on 
Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 
2099 (1979) (determining “that individuals with strong preconceived opinions 
examine evidence in a biased manner”)). 
348 Id. at 1704. 
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Indeed, the effects of expectancy confirmation bias are strongest 
in a situation like a cat’s paw case.349 The decisionmaker may give 
“excessive deference” to the biased subordinate’s story and less credit 
to the employee’s account because of the supervisor’s higher position 
in the workplace hierarchy.350 Further, individuals holding positions of 
power are more likely to be affected by expectancy confirmation 
bias.351 Because of high demands on their cognitive resources and the 
lack of any direct negative consequences, superiors are prone to use 
the hypothesis as a “convenient heuristic” and to conduct 
investigations in an expectancy-confirming way.352 Research also 
demonstrates that expectancy confirmation bias tends to materialize 
more often in situations dealing with ambiguous or complex evidence, 
which is common in employment decisions.353  
Consequently, the notion that an investigation can always remove 
the taint of bias is inherently flawed. The independent investigation 
defense, as it currently stands, does nothing to account for this 
possibility.354 To counteract the effects of expectancy confirmation 
bias, the decisionmaker should inquire into the relevant supervisor’s 
background and motives whenever an employment action is taken 
against a member of a protected class.355 For example, the ultimate 
decisionmaker could interview the supervisor’s colleagues and 
examine the supervisor’s file for potential complaints of biased 
behavior.356 The decisionmaker could study the supervisor’s reports 
                                                 
349 White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 526. 
350 Recent Cases, supra note 340, at 1703–04. 
351 Id. at 1705. 
352 Id. 
353 Id. Research also suggests that the effects of expectancy confirmation bias 
will be magnified where “the deficiencies or transgressions grounding the 
supervisor’s report or recommendation are consistent with a stereotype associated 
with the target employee’s social group.” White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 524–25. 
354 For an argument that the independent investigation issue should be 
considered a question of fact and judges should not be permitted to grant summary 
judgment based on the defense, see Ratliff, supra note 22, at 274–77.  
355 Recent Cases, supra note 340, at 1706. 
356 Id. 
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and recommendations regarding other employees to check for any 
pattern of bias.357 Professors White and Krieger suggest that  
 
[s]uch an affirmative process would require, among other things, 
explicitly considering the possibility that bias had influenced the 
process at its earlier stages, assuring that all available allegation or 
recommendation-inconsistent facts have been energetically 
developed and their potential implications thoroughly explored, 
and subjecting all recommendation-consistent information to 
rigorous critical scrutiny.358  
 
If necessary, an employer could hire an independent outside consultant 
to conduct the investigation, although this option might be costly.359 
Ultimately, the decisionmaker should “explicitly consider[] the 
possibility that bias had influenced the process at its earlier stages” to 
eliminate any discriminatory effects.360 
However, a rigid rule detailing mandatory steps would ignore the 
fact-intensive nature of cat’s paw claims.361 An independent 
investigation standard also must recognize that employers need to be 
able to rely on information from subordinate employees.362 Employers 
should be able to maintain flexibility in conducting these inquiries, 
                                                 
357 Id. 
358 White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 527. 
359 Santoro, supra note 37, at 840. An outside consultant provides the benefit 
of being more experienced in conducting these types of employment investigations, 
interviewing employees and reviewing evidence. Additionally, an outside consultant 
may be more likely than an inside party to assess the situation from an impartial 
perspective. On the other hand, an outside consultant may be less familiar with the 
particular workplace’s culture, organizational structure and the parties involved in 
the employment decision. Id.  
360 White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 527. 
361 Eber, supra note 13, at 194. 
362 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that 
any independent investigation standard must account for the realities of the 
workplace). 
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especially in light of the potential time and costs.363 A more thorough 
investigation does not need to be an onerous or lengthy task.364 
Certainly not every situation would call for a three-day evidentiary 
hearing, as was conducted in Stimpson.365 In sum, courts should 
permit employers to prevent liability by conducting indepe
investigations. But courts must hold employers to a more meaningful 
standard in assessing whether the investigation sufficiently broke the 
causal link.
ndent 
                                                
366  
 
C. Proper Consideration of Agency Principles Serves to Limit 
Employer Liability Under the Cat’s Paw Doctrine 
 
Even after establishing a causal link between a prohibited 
characteristic and the challenged decision, the plaintiff must still 
demonstrate that the disparate treatment can be attributed to the 
employer.367 Such an inquiry relates to the underlying agency 
principles that simultaneously give rise to cat’s paw liability and serve 
to limit its application. A proper application of vicarious liability 
“eases concerns that causation analysis imposes liability for 
discrimination on a too attenuated basis.”368 As discussed in Section 
I.A, Congress’ use of the term agent in defining employer “evince[d] 
an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which 
employers . . . are to be held responsible.”369 The question becomes, 
therefore, which employees can cause liability under the cat’s paw 
doctrine.370  
 
363 Recent Cases, supra note 340, at 1706. 
364 Id. 
365 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999). 
366 Eber, supra note 13, at 195. 
367 White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 517. 
368 Id. at 522. 
369 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
370 Ernest F. Lidge, III, The Male Employee Disciplined for Sexual Harassment 
as Sex Discrimination Plaintiff, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 717, 747 (2000). 
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As can be assumed by this point, the circuit courts have given the 
agency issue varying degrees of attention. Many of the courts utilizing 
the lenient standard essentially ignore the issue of agency. One 
commentator noted that because those courts failed to overtly discuss 
the agency issue, “it is not clear whether these courts view the agency 
link as established by virtue of the actions of the biased subordinate or 
by virtue of the actions of the ultimate decisionmaker.”371 The Fourth 
Circuit based its actual decisionmaker rule, in large part, on agency 
principles.372 The Fourth Circuit limits liability to those employees to 
whom the employer delegated supervisory authority.373 In contrast, the 
Tenth Circuit requires the biased employee to misuse some form of 
delegated authority.374 The court did not limit such authority to only 
supervisory abilities, but held that the “authority to monitor 
performance, report disciplinary infractions, and recommend 
employment actions” also sufficed.375 
The Tenth Circuit’s approach provides the most balanced answer 
to the agency question in cat’s paw cases. By disregarding the agency 
limitation, the lenient courts improperly open the door to automatic 
liability for all employees’ actions. Instead, courts should apply 
agency principles because they properly cabin the situations that can 
expose the employer to cat’s paw liability. The agency limitation 
relates to the deterrent objective of antidiscrimination legislation. In 
other words, employers should be held liable for the “discriminatory 
act of employees that it reasonably may have prevented.”376 
Employers have a better opportunity to prevent and monitor 
misconduct by employees possessing delegated authority than by 
                                                 
371 Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 408. 
372 Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 287 (4th Cir. 
2004) (en banc). 
373 Id. at 288–91. 
374 EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 487 (10th Cir. 
2006). 
375 Id. at 485. 
376 Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 410. 
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ordinary workers.377 For example, an employer should not be held 
vicariously liable if a biased customer or independent contractor filed 
a false report of employee misconduct that caused the employee to be 
terminated.378 Nor would an employer be liable for an ordinary 
employee, lacking any delegated authority, falsely reports another 
employee’s misconduct.379  
On the other hand, Supreme Court precedent and policy concerns 
suggest that vicarious liability should not be limited to only formal 
supervisors. In Ellerth, the Supreme Court concluded that vicarious 
liability exists when a supervisor effectuates a tangible employment 
action against a subordinate.380 Importantly, however, the Ellerth 
Court did not limit liability to only this context.381 Instead, the Court 
remarked that other circumstances implicating employer liability 
based on the agency relationship were “less obvious.”382 The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ellerth “ultimately stands for the proposition that 
an employer may be liable for agency purposes when an employee 
misuses delegated authority that results in an adverse employment 
action.”383 Consequently, courts have properly determined that cat’s 
paw liability, as a specific branch of vicarious liability, exists when the 
biased subordinate who causes the adverse employment action is a 
supervisor. 
Yet, just as Ellerth explicitly noted, this scenario does not 
represent the outer bounds of vicarious liability, and liability may be 
appropriate in other contexts. Employers should also be liable for 
                                                 
377 Brief of Respondent at 23, EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 
450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006) (No. 06–341), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007). 
378 Id. at 22–23. 
379 See White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 519–20 (describing scenario where 
single discriminatory act by an ordinary employee would not give rise to liability 
because “no action properly attributable to the employer was the product of an intent 
to discriminate”). 
380 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998). 
381 Id. at 762–63. 
382 Id. at 763. 
383 Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 412. 
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employee misuse of different types of delegated authority.384 For 
example, an employee lacking formal supervisory ability may still be 
able to make recommendations on issues such as promotion, discipline 
or termination.385 In fact, the increasing prevalence of peer evaluations 
suggests that biased coworkers may have just as much power as 
formal supervisors.386 The biased employee may not hold the title of 
supervisor, but employer liability would still be proper “if the 
recommender’s misuse of that lesser form of delegated authority 
serves as a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.”387 In 
applying agency principles, courts should not be overly formalistic in 
focusing only on whether the employee was vested with the 
appropriate title. Thus, the Fourth’s Circuit’s rigid limitation of 
liability to only actual decisionmakers misinterprets agency principles. 
Consistent with the Tenth Circuit, courts should focus on employees 
with any delegated ability to inflict harm on other employees, instead 
of being unduly limited to only named supervisors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, cat’s paw liability constitutes an important facet of 
employment discrimination law because it accounts for the changing 
structure of workplace personnel departments. Yet, as a relatively new 
legal theory, the cat’s paw doctrine contains several problematic issues 
that need to be addressed. The current circuit split demonstrates the 
difficulty courts have faced in applying the doctrine. Although the 
cat’s paw issue is ripe for review by the Supreme Court, until that time 
comes the circuit courts should attempt to adopt a uniform and sound 
approach. In doing so, courts should utilize a motivating factor 
standard of causation rather than focusing on vague notions of control, 
influence or involvement. Additionally, courts should more carefully 
scrutinize whether an employer’s actions sufficiently break the causal 
                                                 
384 Id. at 411. 
385 Id.  
386 See Kaler, supra note 2, at 1090. 
387 Id. at 412. 
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connection so as to be considered an independent investigation. 
Finally, even after finding causation satisfied, courts should apply 
agency principles to determine if the employer can be held vicariously 
liable for the employee’s actions. By implementing these suggestions, 
courts will do justice to the cat’s paw metaphor.  
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